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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020730-CA
v.
JOHN MICHAEL HASSELBLAD,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for burglary, a second degree felony. This
Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp.
2002).
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

Where defendant did not propose his lesser-included offense
instruction until two court-imposed deadlines had passed and the trial
court had already compiled its instructions, did the court abuse its
discretion in rejecting the instruction as untimely?
A trial court's decision to refuse a jury instruction as untimely is reviewed for

abuse of discretion. State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983).

II.

Did the trial court properly reject defendant's lesser-included offense
instruction where defendant's own testimony, if believed, would acquit
him on possession of stolen property?
"6[T]he refusal to give a requested jury instruction on a claimed lesser included

offense is a legal determination, which [this Court] review[s] for correctness.'" State v.
Payne, 964 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted).
III.

Was defendant entitled to his lesser-included offense instruction on
possession of stolen property where the instruction contained two
elements not required by statute and thus did not accurately state the
applicable law?
Because the trial court did not reach this issue, no standard of review applies.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes and rules, relevant to this appeal, are reproduced in

Addenda A and B respectively:
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(2001);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999). At trial, defendant requested an instruction on possession
of stolen property as a lesser-included offense (R. 249:91-92). After the trial court denied
defendant's request, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 167; R. 249:94-95). The
trial court suspended defendant's statutory prison term and ordered defendant to serve
365 days in jail and 36 months on probation (R. 185). The trial court subsequently denied
defendant's motion for new trial (R. 228). Defendant timely appealed (R. 229).
2

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At about 3:30 p.m. on August 14, 2000, Candida Rodriguez was in her yard when
she saw a group of teenagers walking slowly up and down the street, looking around (R.
249:10, 11, 13, 14). Ms. Rodriguez noticed one girl in the group in particular, who was
wearing a red blouse and black skirt (R. 249:12).
A few minutes later, Ms. Rodriguez left her home in her car (R. 249:13). When
she returned about fifteen minutes later, Ms. Rodriguez was met by neighbors who told
her that someone had broken into her house and that they had already called police (R.
249:15). Ms. Rodriguez noticed that her front door was open and that her VCR and boom
box were missing from the front room (R. 249:16). Ms. Rodriguez had purchased the
VCR about a month before for about $200 (R. 249:17). She had purchased the boom box
about a year before also for about $200 (R. 249:17-18).
When Deputy Sheriff Todd Sisneros arrived shortly thereafter, Ms. Rodriguez
gave him a description of the girl with the red blouse and black skirt (R. 249:20, 57).
Several hours later, a girl matching that description was located by police (R. 249:58-59).
Ms. Rodriguez identified the girl, Sheree Simpson, as the one she had seen earlier that
day (R. 249:20, 59).
After being picked up by police, Sheree admitted that she and defendant, as well as
some other teens, were hanging out in the vicinity of Ms. Rodriguez's home earlier that
day (R. 249:32-33). At one point, Sheree noticed that Ms. Rodriguez's door was open (R.
249:33). When Sheree went to close the door, one of the girls she was with entered the
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house and told defendant there was boom box inside (R. 249:34). Defendant entered the
house and took the boom box (R. 249:34-35, 60). He then re-entered the house and took
the VCR (R. 249:34, 37, 60). Defendant took the boom box and the VCR to his sister's
house a few blocks away (R. 249:37, 40).
Based on Sheree's explanation, Deputy Sisneros went to the home of defendant's
father, where defendant lived, at about 9:00 p.m. (R. 249:60-61). In defendant's room,
under a blanket between the bed and a wall, Deputy Sheriff Sisneros found Ms.
Rodriguez's VCR and boom box (R. 249:62-63). Defendant was not home at the time (R
249-61).
About an hour later, defendant's father called Deputy Sisneros to tell him that
defendant was home (R. 249:63-64). When Deputy Sisneros met with defendant shortly
thereafter, defendant told Deputy Sisneros that people had brought the items to him for
repairs (R. 249:64). Defendant said he didn't know who the people were and could not
give the officer any names (R. 249:64).
At trial, Sheree identified the girl who first entered Ms. Rodriguez's home as
April, defendant's former girlfriend (R. 249:33, 48). April's brother, David, was also
present at the scene (R. 249:33).
Defendant's defense. Defendant's father testified that, on August 14, defendant
was in and out of the house most of the day (R. 249:72). However, around 3:30 p.m. or
4:00 p.m., "it seems like that's when he was home" (R. 249:72). Mr. Hasselblad also
testified that, while napping around 3:00 p.m. or 3:30 p.m., he was awakened by his dog
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barking (R. 249:72-74). At that time, he noticed defendant carrying some electronics
equipment (R. 249:73). Defendant told his father that three kids had come over and
handed him the stuff (R. 249:73/74). Defendant then left to go out with them (R.
249:74). When Mr. Hasselblad looked out the window, he recognized defendant's former
girlfriend, April (R. 249:74). He also saw a male and another female, but did not
recognize them (R. 249:75).
Defendant testified that he saw Sheree Simpson, his former girlfriend April, and
April's brother David on August 14 when they stopped by his house in the afternoon and
dropped off a VCR and boom box (R. 249:77-78). April knew defendant worked on
electronic equipment and asked him to look at the VCR because a line in the back had
been ripped out (R. 249:78). Defendant did not ask the teens any questions (R. 249:83).
When his father asked him whose equipment it was, defendant told him it was none of his
business and took the equipment into his bedroom (R. 249:79). Defendant then left to go
to a friend's house (R. 249:82).
Defendant testified that he heard later that the police had come by the house and
taken the VCR and boom box (R. 249:79). At the time, he didn't know why "but I got
word going through Magna on foot coming home that the cops were out looking for me
so I hurried home as soon as possible" (R. 249:79). By the time the officer arrived
shortly thereafter, defendant knew that the VCR and boom box were stolen property (R.
249:79).
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On cross-examination, defendant admitted that, although he has a hobby of fixing
electronics (R. 249:83-84), he has not taken classes for it (R. 249:84-85). He did "[n]ot
really" know what a capacitor was, and, when asked to explain what a diode was, he said:
"Kind of hard to explain. I'm not really too much into it but I know the chips and
everything are on circuit boards and mostly what they do, like sound chips" (R. 249:84).
Defendant did not have an oscilloscope (R. 249:84). The only equipment he had was "a
soldering gun and solder and wire" (R. 249:84).
Defendant's proposed jury instruction. At the end of a pre-trial hearing on May
21, 2001, the trial court set defendant's trial for July 11, 2001 (R. 248:16). The court then
scheduled a final pre-trial conference for July 9, 2001, and ordered that "jury instructions
will be due" at that time (R. 248:16). Defendant neither objected to the court's order nor
requested an exception for lesser-included offense instructions (R. 248).
When defendant's trial was continued until September, the trial court again
instructed the parties to submit their proposed instructions at the final pre-trial conference
(R. 252:Tab 1:2). Again, defendant neither objected to the trial court's order nor
requested an exception for lesser-included offense instructions (R. 252:Tab 1).
When the court continued defendant's trial to October and reset the final pretrial
conference for September 24, 2001, the court indicated, "I've already got your jury
instructions" (R. 252:Tab 2:2). Defendant did nothing to indicate he reserved the right to
propose further instructions during trial (R. 252:Tab 2:2).
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Defendant's trial was held on October 4, 2001 (R. 249). Just before lunch, the
prosecutor stated that he believed all the evidence in the case, from both the State and
defendant, would be presented by 3:30 p.m., and thus that the case could go to the jury
later that afternoon (R. 249:42). The following then occurred:
Court:

In order to do that, we'd have to spend some time on
jury instructions at some point and since you're
apparently not available over the noon hour today, is
that correct, [defense counsel]?

Defense counsel:
Right, Your Honor. I have to teach a class. I
could take a look at the jury instructions. It's a simple
case so I don't imagine I have —
Court:

I don't think we should need a lot of discussion. What
I'll do is go ahead and put them together the way I
propose to give them over the noon hour and those will
be sitting on your desk when you get back and if you
could find a moment to take a quick look at them and
maybe just on the break we could have a discussion
about that.

(R. 249:42-43). At the end of the lunch break, without raising any jury instruction issue,
defense counsel immediately began cross-examining the State's witness then on the stand
(R. 249:44).
At the close of the evidence, the trial court excused the jury and turned to the jury
instructions (R. 249:91). After defense counsel noted he had no objections to the
instructions compiled by the court, the court turned to the State (R. 249:91). The State
indicated it had no problem with the instructions provided by the court (R. 249:91).
However, the State continued, "I guess I do have some concerns about the lesser included
instruction" (R. 249:91). The trial court agreed:
7

Why did I just get this instruction at the end of the noon hour?
My order was that any proposed jury instructions were to be in at the
time of the pre-trial conference and even at the beginning of the noon
hour I could have accommodated, I could have changed the charge to
include a lesser included offense. It affects more than — I mean, it's
not just a matter of sticking it in. You also have to change other
instructions to accommodate it and why it's submitted this late, I
can't understand. I mean it's just plain late.
(R. 249:92).
Defense counsel agreed that he "should have given it to you before the noon hour"
(R. 249:93). Counsel admitted, "I simply left without giving it to you" (R. 249:93).
The court then ruled:
I'm rejecting the instruction first of all because it's late but
second of all I'm rejecting it because I don't think that a jury could
rationally find, well, in the second instance, it's not a lesser included
offense.... It is not an offense that consists of less than all of the
elements of the crime of [burglary]. It's a very much separate
offense and in fact, he could be charged and convicted of both
offenses in this case. Maybe that's not the case but anyway—and
thirdly, there is no evidence in this case from which a jury could
rationally find that he knew that it had been stolen or believed that it
had been stolen. There was no testimony from him that he believed
it to be stolen or that he knew that it had been stolen. That's the
instruction that you requested. He was never asked whether he
believed it had been stolen. He was never asked whether he knew it
had been stolen and the instruction that you presented doesn't allow
for conviction if he simply had reason to know.
(R. 249:93-94).
Defense counsel objected, arguing first, that "I simply put the language of the
statute in, Your Honor," and second:
Let me say this, Your Honor, I understand that I should have
given it to you before lunch but we thought this was going to go until
tomorrow. We never know if we're going to put lesser included
8

instructions in, first of all until I know whether my client is going to
testify, whether or not the evidence comes in that way. I mean, I
write one up so that we could do that but I don't know even until I
talk to my client or all the evidence is presented whether we're going
to ask for it and many times we don't ask for it on these occasions.
(R. 249:94-95). The court responded:
Well, you can always submit it in advance and withdraw it but
if I'm not even alerted to the possibility that there's a lesser included
theory, I mean that is some of the most difficult decisions judges
make in these cases, whether to instruct on the lesser included
offense and the reason why I ask for instructions to be submitted in
advance of trial is so that I can do that research and do that thinking
deliberately and not on the spur of the moment.
(R. 249:95). The court further explained, "[a]ttempted theft could be a lesser included
offense of burglary but theft by receiving, I don't see any stretch by which that can be a
lesser included offense in burglary. But if there is a rational basis for doing that, that's
the reason we need to have a heads up on this other than at the last minute" (R. 249:96).
"And frankly, if this case were simply a case of theft of receiving stolen property and
these are the elements of that, I'd grant a directed verdict. The case hasn't been made out.
The jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt these elements" (R. 249:97).
Defense counsel again objected, arguing:
I don't have to present all the possible lesser included offenses that I
might put in until—strategically I don't have to [do] that until the
evidence is in. I don't know that there's anything that requires me to
do that.
I don't think we have to put the State on notice of a lesser
included.
(R. 249:97-98).
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The court responded: "When I as a Judge order the jury instructions be in as of a
certain day, I don't know that you [cjan disregard that without peril, without risk, okay?"
(R. 249:98). The court concluded:
You know it would be different if you were surprised. I disagree. I
strongly disagree that it's your strategic option to disregard my order
to have your jury instructions in by a certain time. On the other hand
if you were surprised by evidence, that would be one thing. But if
this is your theory from day one, which it sounds like it was, then I
think you need to have them in when I order them in. We'll be in
recess.
(R. 249:98-99).
Defendant renewed his objection to the court's ruling in his motion for new trial
(R. 189-90, 196-99; R. 250:Tab 1). After argument, the court denied defendant's motion:
[P]art of the basis for my decision is the belie[f] is that the
instruction was submitted late
I always make it an order in the
case that instructions are to be in at the time of the final pretrial
conference but, you know, I recognize that things can come up
during the trial and I don't hold people religiously to that. But after
we've got to the point where the final jury instructions are prepared,
absent surprise by something that happens during the trial, I'm not
prepared, typically, at that time to entertain new jury instructions.
Only in the event of a surprise would I be willing to do that and it's
my firm recollection in this case that we had put the jury, I had put
the jury instructions in final form.
Secondly, it's my view that even that aside, I would not have
given the lesser included offense instruction in this case. I think that
the relationship between the charge of receiving stolen property is
insufficiently related to the charge of burglary to justify the evidence
in this case, a lesser included offense.
And, thirdly, I don't think the jury could have rationally
convicted the defendant of theft by receiving stolen property on the
evidence that was presented in this case. The only evidence was the
defendant's own testimony. The only alternate theory of how he
received this equipment, this stereo equipment was his own
10

testimony and if the jury believed his testimony, there was nothing in
his testimony that suggested that he knew or had reason to know that
his property was stolen.
(R. 250:Tab 1:16-17).
Defendant's proposed jury instruction contains no date indicating when it was filed
(R. 116). The instruction appears in the record immediately after the State's proposed
instructions dated July 9, 2001 (R. 111-16).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his proposed lesserincluded offense instruction because the instruction was timely presented and because he
was entitled to the instruction under the general rule governing defense requested lesser
included offense instructions. Neither of defendant's claims have merit. Moreover,
defendant was not entitled to his proposed instruction bcause it did not accurately state
the applicable law.
Point I. The trial court properly rejected defendant's proposed instruction as
untimely. As allowed under the rules of criminal procedure, the trial court twice ordered
that all proposed jury instructions be submitted at the final pre-trial conference.
Defendant did not object to the court's orders or request an exception to those orders for
lesser-included offense instructions. Then, during the one-day trial, the court informed
the parties that it would be compiling the jury instructions over the lunch break.
Defendant did not file his proposed jury instruction until he returned from lunch.
Moreover, defendant did not ask to discuss the instruction at that time but, rather
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immediately began cross-examining the State's witness who was then on the stand.
Under such circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
defendant's instruction as untimely.
Point II. The trial court properly rejected defendant's proposed lesser-included
offense instruction because defendant's own testimony did not allow the jury to both
acquit defendant of the greater crime and convict him of the lesser. Conviction for
receiving stolen property requires evidence that defendant knew or had reason to know
the property was stolen at the time he received it. Defendant's testimony at trial was that
he only learned the property was stolen after the police had already confiscated it.
Because defendant's testimony supported a complete innocence defense and controverted
a key element of the crime of possession of stolen property, defendant was not entitled to
his lesser-included offense instruction.
Point III. Even assuming defendant's first two claims have merit, defendant was
not entitled to his proposed instruction because it did not accurately state the applicable
law. Defendant's instruction requires that defendant unlawfully and intentionally receive,
retain, or dispose of property knowing it has been stolen or believing that it has probably
been stolen. The statute defining the crime of receiving stolen property does not contain
the emphasized language. Because defendant's proposed instruction contains two
elements not contained in the statutory definition, the instruction misstates the law, and
thus, defendant had no right to it. Although the trial court did not reject defendant's
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instruction on this basis, this Court may affirm the trial court's ruling on any basis
apparent in the record.
ARGUMENT
I.

WHERE DEFENDANT DID NOT PROPOSE HIS LESSERINCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION UNTIL TWO COURTIMPOSED DEADLINES HAD PASSED AND THE TRIAL COURT
HAD ALREADY COMPILED ITS INSTRUCTIONS, THE COURT
DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REJECTING THE
INSTRUCTION AS UNTIMELY
Defendant challenges on numerous grounds the trial court's ruling that his

proposed jury instruction was untimely. Aplt. Br. at 30-32, 34-35, 37, 39. None of
defendant's claims have merit.
'Trial courts must be accorded reasonable latitude to move trials along." State v.
Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). Thus, a trial court's ruling that a proposed jury
instruction is untimely is reviewed for "abuse of discretion." Id.\ but see Schwartz v.
Benzow, 2000 UT App 203, 2000 WL 33250573, at *1 (memorandum decision)
(reviewing rejection of instruction as untimely "for correctness") (Addendum C).
A.

Defendant's appellate claim that he submitted his instruction
prior to trial contradicts his own counsel's statements below.

Defendant claims that the trial court improperly rejected his proposed instruction
as untimely because "the record indicates that defense counsel submitted the proposed
instruction at the first pretrial conference in July 2001, three months before . . . trial."
Aplt. Br. at 30-32. Defendant relies on two parts of the record to support his claim.
Defendant notes first that a court clerk, who is required to place documents in
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chronological order in preparing the record on appeal, "placed the proposed instruction
between the State's proposed instructions . . . which were filed on July 9, 2001, and the
minute entry noting the postponement of the original trial date on July 10, 2001." Aplt.
Br. at 32. He notes second that the trial court, at the August 2001 pre-trail conference,
told the parties it '"already [had] your jury instructions and requested voir dire.'" Aplt.
Br. at 32 (citing R. 252B:2). Defense counsel's own admissions below defeat his claim.
At trial, the court announced it would be compiling jury instructions over the lunch
break (R. 249:42-43). During a conference on instructions a short while later, the court
asked defense counsel why he had not filed his instruction before lunch (R. 249:92).
Counsel never argued that he had in fact submitted his instruction before trial (R. 249:9299). To the contrary, counsel admitted that he had only submitted his instruction after
lunch when he acknowledged that he "should have given it to [the court] before the noon
hour" and "apologize[d] for not making that known sooner" (R. 249:93). Similarly, when
the issue was revisited in defendant's motion for new trial, counsel did not argue that he
had submitted his instruction before trial (R. 250:Tab 1). Rather, he again admitted, "I
simply brought the lesser included back from lunch" (R. 250:Tab 1:13, 14).
The record upon which defendant now relies to contradict those admissions is
insufficient. First, defendant's proposed instruction contains no date and thus no
indication of where it should be placed chronologically in the file. Absent such
indication, the court clerk's after-the-fact logical placement of the instruction with the
State's instructions offers little insight as to when the instruction was actually proposed.
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Second, when the trial court made its general statement that it had received the
parties' proposed instructions, the court had already twice ordered the parties to submit
their instructions, and the court had already received the State's proposed instructions (R.
248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2; R. 111-15). The court's statement, then, could easily reflect its
reasonable conclusion that, having received no instructions from defendant, the State's
instructions were the only instructions the parties intended to propose.
Given defense counsel's repeated admissions below that he did not file his
instruction until after lunch on the day of trial, defendant's claim that the trial court erred
in rejecting his instruction as untimely because he submitted it before trial fails.
B.

Defendant's claim that rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, allowed him to ignore the trial court's pre-trial
orders requiring submission of proposed jury instructions by the
final pre-trial conference fails under the rule's plain language.

Twice prior to trial, the trial court ordered that proposed jury instructions be
submitted by the final pre-trial conference (R. 248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2). On appeal,
defendant claims that rule 19, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, gave him leave to
ignore the court's orders. Aplt. Br. at 31-37. Rule 19 does not support defendant's claim.
In making his argument, defendant relies on rule 19 as it was amended effective
November 1, 2001. Aplt. Br. at 31-33 (citing language in subsections (a) and (b) that
appears in amended rule but not the previous version); see also Utah R. Crim. P. 19
(2002) (Addendum A). However, defendant's trial was held on October 4, 2001 (R. 249).
Because defendant's trial occurred prior to the November amendment of the rule, the
preceding version applies in considering defendant's claim. See State v. Nelson15

Waggoner, 2000 UT 59,fflj4-5, 17 n.6, 6 P.3d 1120 (applying rule of evidence as it
existed at time of trial), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1164 (2000); State v. Decorso, 1999 UT
57, f 26,993P.2d837. 1
When interpreting a court rule, this Court applies the same rules of construction
applicable to statutes. State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, \ 31, 20 P.3d 271. "When faced with
a question of statutory construction, [this Court] look[s] first to the plain language of the
statute." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997) (citation
omitted). Terms are interpreted "'according to their commonly accepted meaning unless
the ordinary meaning . . . results in an application that is either unreasonably confused,
inoperable,... or in blatant contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'" State ex
rel L.P., 981 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah App. 1999) (citations omitted)).
On October 4, 2001, rule 19(a) provided:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file [a] written request that the
court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the
same time copies of such requests shall be furnished to the other
parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon
the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be
given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
Utah R.Crim. P. 19(a) (2001).

'In relying on the version of the rule in effect at the time of defendant's trial, the
State does not concede that a different result would occur under the amended rule.
Because the amended rule was not in effect at the time of defendant's trial, this Court
need not decide that issue.
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This provision clearly states that parties may submit proposed jury instructions
"[a]t the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs"
Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (emphasis added). Thus, under the plain language of subsection (a),
a trial court may order parties to submit their proposed jury instructions prior to the close
of evidence.
Nothing in the remaining subsections of the rule limits the trial court's authority
under subsection (a) to order that instructions be submitted prior to the close of evidence.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(b)-(d). Moreover, nothing in the remaining subsections allows a
criminal defendant to ignore the trial court if it enters such an order. Id.
Consequently, defendant's claim that rule 19 authorized him to submit his
proposed instruction after the court's pre-trial deadlines fails.
C.

Where defendant never objected to the trial court's pre-trial
orders or its mid-trial compilation of jury instructions, the
court's rejection of defendant's instruction as untimely was not
an abuse of discretion.

Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting his proposed
instruction as untimely because (1) before lunch, the court "affirmatively represented that
the parties could submit additional instructions following the lunch break," Aplt. Br. at
34; and (2) "[bjasic fairness supports allowing parties to offer instructions at the close of
the evidence," "strategic reasons argue against requesting lesser offense instruction in
advance," and the evidence supports his instruction, Aplt. Br. at 34, 35. Neither of
defendant's claims have merit.
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1.

Defendant's claim that the court affirmatively indicated it
would accept instructions after the lunch break is not
supported by the record; moreover, given the trial court's
pre-trial orders, defendant had no reasonable basis upon
which to believe instructions would be accepted at trial.

Defendant claims that, even if his proposed instruction was not submitted until
trial, the trial court improperly rejected it because the court "affirmatively represented
that the parties could submit additional instructions following the lunch break" and
"defense counsel reasonably relied on the trial judge's representations based on his past
practice with other judges." Aplt. Br. at 31, 34, 37. Defendant's claim is not supported
by the record.
Prior to lunch on the day of trial, the prosecutor stated that he believed all the
evidence in the case would be presented by 3:30 p.m., and thus that the case could go to
the jury later that afternoon (R. 249:42). The following then occurred:
Court:

In order to do that, we'd have to spend some time on
jury instructions at some point and since you're
apparently not available over the noon hour today, is
that correct, [defense counsel]?

Defense counsel: Right, Your Honor. I have to teach a class. I
could take a look at the jury instructions. It's a simple
case so I don't imagine I have —
Court:

I don't think we should need a lot of discussion. What
I'll do is go ahead and put them together the way I
propose to give them over the noon hour and those will
be sitting on your desk when you get back and if you
could find a moment to take a quick look at them and
maybe just on the break we could have a discussion
about that.
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(R. 249:42-43). Nothing in the court's language even hints that the court would entertain
new instructions after the lunch period.
Moreover, prior to trial, the trial court twice ordered that proposed jury instructions
be submitted by the final pre-trial conference (R. 248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2). Defendant
neither objected to the court's orders nor requested an exception for lesser-included
offense instructions. Under such circumstances, defendant had no reasonable basis upon
which to rely on other courts' practices in assuming the court would accept additional
jury instructions during trial.
Consequently, defendant's claim that he reasonably relied on the trial court's
representations at trial in offering his instruction after lunch fails.
2.

State v. Evans defeats defendant's claim that "basic fairness/9
"strategic reasons," and the evidence at trial render the trial
court's ruling an abuse of discretion.

Defendant claims that, even if he submitted his instruction late, the trial court
abused its discretion in rejecting the instruction as untimely because "[bjasic fairness
supports allowing parties to offer instructions at the close of the evidence," because
"strategic reasons argue against requesting lesser offense instruction in advance," and
because the evidence supports his instruction, Aplt. Br. at 34, 35. State v. Evans, 668
P.2d 566 (Utah 1983), and sound policy considerations defeat his claim.
In State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566, 567 (Utah 1983), the trial court announced at the
close of evidence that it would recess for a period during which it would compile its jury
instructions. When the court reconvened, Evans proffered lesser-included offense
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instructions, which the trial court rejected. Id. On appeal, Evans challenged the trial
court's ruling, arguing that the evidence "was sufficient to support a jury instruction on
[a] lesser included offense." Id. In rejected Evan's claim, the supreme court noted that
"[cjounsel had not advised the court of the necessity for an extension of time to prepare
[his instructions]; nor . . . had he earlier notified the court that he even intended to submit
them." Id. "[H]aving failed to timely request an instruction .. ., the defendant is not
now in any position to complain of the court's failure to give it." Evans, 668 P.2d at 567;
see also Schwartz v. Benzow, 2000 UT App 203, 2000 WL 33250573, at *1
(memorandum decision) (affirming trial court's denial of proposed instruction filed after
court-ordered deadline where party had "fail[ed] to notify the court that she wished to
submit jury instructions by the court's specified deadline") (Addendum C). Rather,
"counsel's failure to notify the court that he wished to submit requested instructions
knowing that the court would be preparing them during the recess, carries with it the same
consequence of failing to submit them at all." Evans, 668 P.2d at 568.
Evans disposes of defendant's claim here. Twice prior to trial, the trial court
ordered that all proposed jury instructions be filed by the final pre-trial conference (R.
248:16; R. 252:Tab 1:2). Defendant neither objected to the court's orders nor requested
an exception for lesser included offense instructions. Then, at trial, the court indicated
before lunch that it would be compiling its proposed jury instructions over the lunch
break (R. 249:42). Defendant again did nothing to alert the court that he intended to
submit additional instructions (R. 249:42-43). Thus, despite numerous opportunities
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either to present his instruction to the court in a timely manner or to inform the court that
such an instruction may be forthcoming, defendant did nothing until after the court had
compiled its instructions. Under these facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to accept defendant's belated request. Evans, 668 P.2d at 567-68.
Defendant's attempts to distinguish Evans are unavailing. First, defendant claims
that Evans does not apply because "defense counsel below specifically preserved the
denial of the lesser offense instruction for appeal by following the procedures set forth in
Rule 19." Aplt. Br. at 40. However, when Evans was decided, the rule governing jury
instructions was identical to rule 19 at the time of defendant's trial. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-35-19 (1982) (Addendum A); see also Point LB. supra. Thus, defendant's reliance
on rule 19 to distinguish Evans is unfounded.
Second, defendant claims that Evans does not apply because "defense counsel. ..
follow[ed] up [his] request [at trial] with a motion for new trial." Aplt. Br. at 40.
However, "[r]aising an issue in a post-trial motion . . . does not [automatically] preserve
that issue for appeal." Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 678 & n.6 (Utah
App. 1994); see also State v. Erickson, 722 P.2d 756, 759 (Utah 1986) (per curiam).
Rather, before this Court will find the matter preserved, the trial court, in ruling on the
motion, must either expressly or implicitly waive defendant's prior waiver. See, e.g.,
State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) (holding "trial court in
effect reopened the trial when it held an evidentiary hearing to address defendant's claim"
after trial); State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991); State v. Johnson, 821
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P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). Here, in denying defendant's motion for new trial, the trial
court specifically re-iterated its untimeliness ruling (R. 250:Tab 1:16-17). Thus,
defendant's reassertion of his claim in his motion for new trial did nothing to cure his
waiver under Evans.
Third, defendant claims that Evans does not apply because "the trial judge in this
case never indicated that he planned to instruct the jury immediately after the lunch recess
or that the time for requesting additional instructions had passed." Aplt. Br. at 40.
However, Evans nowhere suggests that the trial court's intention to immediately instruct
the jury after compiling its instructions was the determinative issue in affirming the trial
court's untimeliness ruling; rather, the determinative issue was that defendant had neither
proffered his proposed instructions nor intimated that they might be forthcoming until
after the trial court, with notice to the parties, had compiled its instructions. Evans, 668
P.2d at 567. And, as previously discussed, where the court issued two pre-trial orders
requiring that instructions be submitted before trial, and then expressly stated its intention
to compile jury instructions over the lunch hour, defendant should have clearly known
that "the time for requesting additional had passed." Aplt. Br. at 40.
Fourth, defendant claims that Evans does not apply here because the evidence
supports his lesser-included offense instruction. Aplt. Br. at 31. However, the defendant
raised the same claim on appeal in challenging that trial court's ruling in Evans. Evans,
668 P.2d at 567. The supreme court rejected it. Id. at 567-68.
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Finally, defendant claims that Evans does not apply because "basic fairness
supports allowing parties to offer instructions at the close of the evidence" and "strategic
reasons argue against requesting lesser offense instruction in advance." Aplt. Br. at 34-35.
Both of these challenges, however, could and should have been raised when the trial court
first entered its pre-trial orders or, at the latest, when the court indicated it would be
compiling its instructions over the lunch break. Cf State v. Johnson, 11r4 P.2d 1141,
1144 (Utah 1989) (holding "'a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific
preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before an
appellate court will review such claims on appeal'") (citation omitted). Neither serves as
an after-the-fact justification for remaining silent.
Moreover, defendant's "basic fairness" and "strategic reasons" claims raise serious
equity issues for both the trial court and the State when, as here, defendant's request for a
lesser offense instruction involves an offense that is not "necessarily included" in the
offense charged.2
As the trial court noted, and indeed as this case highlights, see Points II and HI
infra, whether to instruct the jury on such lesser-included offenses "[are] some of the
most difficult decisions judges make in these cases" (R. 249:95). A responsible court,

2

A lesser offense is "necessarily included" in the greater when "the greater cannot
be committed without necessarily having committed the lesser." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d
152, 155-56 (Utah 1983). Under Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), a defendant is, upon
proper request, entitled not only to a lesser included offense instruction on necessarily
included offenses but on any lesser offenses that are "related" to the charged offense
"because some of their statutory elements overlap, and . . . the evidence at the trial of the
greater offense includes proof of some or all of those overlapping elements." Id. at 159.
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therefore, may understandably want "a heads up" that an instruction may be forthcoming
so that the court may "do . . . research and . .. think[] deliberately" in deciding its
appropriateness (R. 249:95-96). Yet, if "basic fairness" and "strategic reasons" require
courts to accept surprise instructions at the close of evidence despite prior orders to
propose them earlier, the responsible court may very well feel compelled to make its
decision "on the spur of the moment," thereby increasing the possibility of error, since the
only other option would be to impose a potentially lengthy delay on the proceedings in
order to given the instructions their due consideration (R. 249:95). Certainly, neither
"basic fairness" nor "strategic reasons" justify this result.
Moreover, as defendant correctly notes, the State "bear[s] the burden of proving
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, even on lesser offenses." Aplt. Br. at 35. Yet, if a
defendant can ignore a court order that instructions be submitted prior to trial and wait to
request a lesser included offense instruction until the close of evidence, the State will
have been placed in the untenable position of not knowing what it has to prove until it is
too late to prove it. In addition, the State, like the court, is forced to address the
appropriateness of the proposed instruction, see Point II infra, and the correctness of the
proposed instruction, see Point III infra, "on the spur of the moment," without adequate
time to research either issue.
As the supreme court held in State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 506-07 (Utah 1997),
"[b]oth parties"—not just the State—"share a duty to help ensure a fair trial" Thus,
defendant has no more right to an "acquittal by ambush" than does the State to a "trial by
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ambush." Jones v. State, 575 S.E.2d 456, 459 (Ga. 2003). Yet, this is exactly what a
defendant is encouraged to do if "basic fairness" and "strategic reasons" allow him,
contrary to court orders otherwise, to withhold such lesser-included offense instructions
until the close of evidence.
Surprises at trial, of course, may necessitate consideration of instructions offered
outside a trial court's orders. However, where, as the court noted here, defendant planned
to submit his instruction "from day one" (R. 249:98-99), this was not such a case.
Under the totality of the circumstances, then, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting defendant's lesser-included offense instruction as untimely.
D.

Defendant cannot establish that the trial court's rejection of his
instruction constituted manifest injustice where case law
supports the trial court's ruling.

Finally, defendant argues that, "[e]ven if defense counsel had delayed in
requesting the instruction, the trial judge . . . committed a manifest injustice in refusing to
instruct the jury on [his] theory of the case." Aplt. Br. at 31.
"When reviewing a claim of manifest injustice, [this Court] generally use[s] the
same standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists." State v. Rudolph,
970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998). Under that standard, defendant must show that the
trial court committed error, that the error should have been obvious, and that the error was
"of sufficient magnitude that it affect[ed] the substantial rights of the party." Id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Here, defendant's complete argument in support of his manifest injustice claim is
that, "[a]s demonstrated previously, the trial court plainly erred in refusing to give the
jury the option of convicting [him] based on the facts rather than what the prosecutor
opted to charge." Aplt. Br. at 42-43. However, as discussed above, none of defendant's
prior claims establish that the trial court erred, let alone obviously erred, in rejecting
defendant's instruction as untimely. See pp. 13-25 infra.
Consequently, defendant's challenge to the trial court's rejection of his instruction
as untimely fails.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S
LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION WHERE
DEFENDANT'S OWN TESTIMONY, IF BELIEVED, WOULD
ACQUIT HIM ON POSSESSION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
Defendant claims that the trial court "erred in refusing to give the lesser offense

instruction" because "the crimes of burglary and receiving stolen property overlapped''
and the evidence at trial "supported acquitting [him] of burglary and convicting him of
receiving stolen property." Aplt Br. at 22, 23. However, because defendant's own
testimony at trial was inconsistent with a finding of guilt for possession of stolen
property, the trial court properly rejected defendant's instruction.
A defendant generally has the right to a lesser-included offense instruction if
"(1) the two offenses are related because some of their statutory
elements overlap, and the evidence at trial of the greater offense
involves proof of some or all of those overlapping elements; and
(2) the evidence provides a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the
lesser-included offense."
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State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106, \ 23, 61 P.3d 1019 (quoting State v. Evans, 2002 UT 22,1J 18,
20P.3d888).
However, a defendant has no right to a lesser-included offense instruction where
he denies any complicity at all "and thus lays no foundation for any intermediate verdict."
State v. Doughery, 550 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1976), disapproved of on other grounds by
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1983); see also State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785,
790 (Utah 1984) (holding that where "[a]ll the evidence defendant presented at trial was
to the effect that he had not caused [the victim's] death,... [defendant's own theory of
defense precluded the requested [lesser-included offense] instruction on manslaughter");
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 533-534 (Utah 1983) (holding manslaughter instruction
properly refused in murder conviction where defendants attempted to show they had not
caused victim's death); State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 159-60 (Utah 1983) (holding
defendant was not entitled to lesser-included offense instruction against burglary charge
where u[t]he thrust of the defendant's evidence . . . was to negate any specific intent at all,
not to prove the existence of one of the intents necessary for criminal trespass"); State v.
Cox, 826 P.2d 656, 662-63 (Utah App. 1992) (holding instruction on criminal trespass
properly denied in burglary conviction where defendant testified he never entered the
premises); see also United States v. Brown, 26 F.3d 119, 120 (11th Cir. 1994) ("When a
defendant relies on an exculpatory defense that, if believed, would lead to acquittals on
both the greater and lesser charges, it is no abuse of discretion to refuse to instruct the
jury on a lesser included offense."); State v. German, 30 P.3d 360, 362 f 11 (Mont. 2001)
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("A lesser-included offense instruction is not supported by the evidence when the
defendant's evidence or theory, if believed, would require an acquittal."); Walker v.
State, 876 P.2d 646, 649 (Nev. 1*994) ('To be entitled to an instruction as to a lesser
included offense, the defendant's theory of defense must be consistent with a conviction
for the lesser offense.").
In this case, defendant requested a lesser-included jury instruction on possession of
stolen property (R. 116). Defendant's request was based on his own testimony that he did
not participate in the burglary but rather received the property later that day at his home
from three friends who wanted him to fix the VCR (R. 249:92; R. 250:Tab 1:3-4).
Defendant argued that this testimony, combined with his father's somewhat corroborating
testimony, the location of the equipment under a blanket in his room, and his own
testimony on cross-examination suggesting he didn't know much about electrical
components, supported his instruction (R. 249:92; R. 250:Tab 1:3-4). The trial court
rejected defendant's argument, ruling that where "[t]here was no testimony from
[defendant] that he believed [the property] to be stolen or that he knew that it was stolen,"
the evidence did not support defendant's instruction (R. 249:93-94).
Even assuming arguendo that possession of stolen property is sufficiently related
to burglary to support a lesser-included offense instruction, defendant's own testimony, in
which he denied complicity in either the charged crime or the lesser included, rendered
the evidence insufficient to support the instruction in this case. See Shabata, 678 P.2d at
790; Crick, 675 P.2d at 533-34; Baker, 671 P.2d at 159-60; Doughery, 550 P.2d at 176;
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Cox, 826 P.2d at 662-63; Brown, 26 F.3d at 120; German, 30 P.3d at 362; Walker, 876
P.2dat575.
A person is guilty of receiving stolen property if:
[1]

he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another

[2]

knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably
has been stolen, OR

[la]

[he] conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling or
withholding the property from the owner

[2a]

knowing the property to be stolen

[3]

intending to deprive the owner of it.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999).
Here, defendant testified that he did not learn that the property was stolen until
after he had heard that the police had confiscated it (R. 249:79, 81-82). This testimony, if
believed, would acquit him of possession of stolen property. Thus, "[t]he thrust of the
defendant's evidence . . . was to negate any specific intent at all, not to prove the
existence of... the intent[] necessary for [the lesser-included offense]." Baker, 671 P.2d
at 159-60.
Because defendant's testimony "la[id] no foundation for any intermediate verdict,"
Doughery, 550 P.2d at 176, the trial court properly rejected his lesser-included offense
instruction as unsupported by the evidence.
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HI.

DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS LESSER-INCLUDED
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION ON POSSESSION OF STOLEN
PROPERTY WHERE THE INSTRUCTION CONTAINED TWO
ELEMENTS NOT REQUIRED BY STATUTE AND THUS DID NOT
ACCURATELY STATE THE APPLICABLE LAW
Both during trial and in response to defendant's motion for new trial, the State

argued that, in addition to rejecting defendant's instruction because it was untimely and
unsupported by the evidence, the trial court should reject it because it did not accurately
define the applicable law (R. 222; R. 249:96-97; R. 250:Tab 1:12). Although the trial
court did not rule on this part of the State's argument, this Court should affirm the trial
court's ruling on this ground because it is apparent in the record. See State v. Allred,
2002 UT App 291,111, 55 P.2d 1158 ("[I]t is well settled that an appellate court may
affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
trial court.") (citation and internal quotation mark omitted).
"Generally, a defendant is entitled to instruction on his theory of the case if there is
a reasonable basis in the evidence to justify giving the requested instruction." State v.
Padilla, 776 P.2d 1329, 1331 (Utah 1989). However, "[t]he trial court may reject the
defendant's instruction where the instruction incorrectly states the law." State v. Bluff,
2002 UT 66, 1 21, 52 P.3d 1210; State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-99 (Utah 1991);
State v. Dumas, 111 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986). An instruction that adds elements to a
crime beyond that required by statute incorrectly states the law. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at
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f 23 (affirming trial court's rejection of proposed instruction that added elements to
felony murder beyond those required by statute).
In this case, defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on possession of
stolen property as a lesser-included offense of burglary (R. 116). As stated previously,
under section 76-6-408, a person is guilty of receiving stolen property if:
[1]

he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another

[2]

knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably
has been stolen, OR

[la]

[he] conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling or
withholding the property from the owner

[2a]

knowing the property to be stolen

[3]

intending to deprive the owner of it.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999).
Defendant's proposed instruction, in contrast, provided:
Before you can convict the defendant of the
crime of Receiving Stolen Property, Theft, you must
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all
of the following elements of that crime:
1.

In Salt lake County, on or about August 14, 2000, the
defendant;

2.

Unlawfully9, and

3-

Intentionally,

4.

Received, retained or disposed of property of another;
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5.

Knowing that it had been stolen, or believing that it probably
had been stolen, or concealed or withheld or aided in
concealing or withholding property of another knowing it to
be stolen; and

6.

Intended to deprive the owner of the property.

(R. 116) (emphasis added).
A simple comparison of the statutory elements and the elements set forth in
defendant's instruction reveals that defendant's instruction includes two elements—that
he received the property unlawfully and that he received it intentionally—not required
under the statute.
Thus, under defendant's instruction, the State had to prove not only that defendant
received property knowing it had been stolen or had probably been stolen—as required
under the statute—but also that he did so "'other than accidentally] or careless[ly]'" and
"'without justification.'" State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, f 18, 64 P J d 1218 (explaining
impact of inserting "intentionally" and "unlawfully" into criminal statute) (quoting State
v. Durant, 61A P.2d 638, 645 (Utah 1983)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999)
(providing that person acts "[ijntentionally .. .with respect to the nature of his conduct or
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result").
Because defendant's instruction increased the burden of the State beyond that
required under the statute, it was clearly an incorrect statement of the law. See Bluff,
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2002 UT 66 at J 23. Consequently, defendant was not entitled to it. Bluff, 2002 UT 66,
at 1 21; James, 819 P.2d at 798-99; Dumas, 721 P.2d at 506.3
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's conviction
and sentence.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED _/_7_ April 2003.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

KAREN A. KLUCZNIK
Assistant Attorney General

3

Although defendant claims that, instead of rejecting his instruction, the trial court
should have taken steps to correct it, defendant cites no legal authority in Utah, nor has
the State found any, for that proposition. Rather, our courts have simply held that "[t]he
trial court may reject the defendant's instruction where the instruction incorrectly states
the law." Bluff, 2002 UT 66, at 121; see also James, 819 P.2d at 798-99; Dumas, 111
P.2d at 506.
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Addenda

Addendum A

Addendum A

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(2001)
Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(2002)
Rule 19. Instructions.
(a) After the jury is sworn and before opening statements, the court may
instruct the jury concerning the jurors' duties and conduct, the order of
proceedings, the elements and burden of proof for the alleged crime, and the
definition of terms. The court may instruct the jury concerning any matter
stipulated to by the parties and agreed to by the court and any matter the court
in its discretion believes will assist the jurors in comprehending the case.
Preliminary instructions shall be in writing and a copy provided to each juror.
At the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs, a
party may file a written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as
set forth in the request. The court shall inform the parties of its action upon a
requested instruction prior to instructing the jury, and it shall furnish the
parties with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this
requirement.
(b) During the course of the trial, the court may instruct the jury on the law
if the instruction will assist the jurors in comprehending the case. Prior to
giving the written instruction, the court shall advise the parties of its intent to
do so and of the content of the instruction. A party may request an interim
written instruction.
(c) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties waive this requirement. Final
instructions shall be in writing and at least one copy provided to the jury. The
court shall provide a copy to any juror who requests one and may, in its
discretion, provide a copy to all jurors.
(d) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of
the charge was given and what part was refused.
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the instructions
are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may be made after they are
given to the jury, but before the jury retires to consider its verdict. The court
shall provide an opportunity to make objections outside the hearing of the jury.
Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the
instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice.
In statig the objection the party shall identify the matter to whcih the objection
is made and the ground of the objection.matter to which he objects and the
ground of his objection.
(f) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(g) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has
given the jury its final instructions. Unless otherwise provided by law, any
limitation upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.)

Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-19 (1982)
77-35-19. Rule 19 — Instructions, (a) At the close of the evidence or
at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any party may file
written request that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth
in the request. At the same time copies of such requests shall be furnished
to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions may be
given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement.
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the
court shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given
and part refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement
what part of the charge was given and what part was refused.
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the
court refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are
the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court
has instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation
upon time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1999)
76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
ase of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.
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Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS, and ORME. JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official
Publication)
GREENWrOOD.
*1 Rae Lyn Schwartz appeals from a jury verdict
finding both parties fifty percent at fault, resulting in a
judgment for defendant, David Benzow. Specifically,
Schwartz appeals three rulings by the trial court: (1)
failure to grant a new trial because of an inconsistent
jury verdict, (2) admission of hearsay evidence at trial,
and (3) refusal to give a requested jury instruction. We
affirm.
Schwartz argues that she is entitled to a new trial
because the jury verdict was inconsistent. Schwartz first
objected to the inconsistent verdict approximately two
months after the jury rendered its verdict, in a motion
for a new trial, which the trial court subsequently
denied. The "failure to object to a verdict, informal or
insufficient on its face, before the jury is discharged,
constitutes a waiver of that objection." Ute~Cal Land
Dev. Corp. v. Sather. 605 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Utah 1980)
(citation omitted). "[C]ounsel has the obligation not
only to object to the form of the verdict, but to
affirmatively seek to examine it." Martmeau v.
Anderson. 636 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Utah 1981). Because
Schwartz failed to raise concerns about the
inconsistency of the jury verdict until more than two
Copr. © West 2003 No (

months after the jury was discharged, Schwartz wai\ ed
any challenge to the jury verdict.
Next, Schwartz argues that admission of hearsay
testimony at trial was prejudicial error. We review
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion; however,
" ' "[a]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude
evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the
error is harmful." *" Suite v Jaeser. 1999 UT 1, c 30.
973 P.2d404 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Schwartz objects to the police officer's testimony that
one biker told him that she did not recall a jeep passing
by at all and that a second biker told him that the jeep
was fifteen feet past Schwartz when the crash occurred.
However, a third biker, Jeffery Branigan, who was
Schwartz's witness, directly testified that he saw the
jeep crowd and honk at the bikers but did not see the
jeep make contact with Schwartz's bike. Both hearsay
statements, admitted through the police officer's
testimony, are entirely consistent with the core of
Branigan's testimony, namely that he did not see
contact between the jeep and Schwartz's bike.
Therefore, if the admission of the hearsay statements
was error, the error was harmless and not reversible.
Finally, Schwartz claims that it was prejudicial for the
trial judge to deny her request for a jury instruction
about the illegality of driving across a double yellow
line. "We review a judge's refusal to give a jury
instruction for correctness, as it is a question of law."
Robinson v. All-Star Delivery. Inc.. 1999 UT 109, «i 9,
992P.2d969, Schwartz's failure to notify the court that
she wished to submit jury instructions by the court's
specified deadline "carries with it the same
consequence of failing to submit them at all." State v
Evans. 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). A pretrial order
specified that the last day to submit jury instructions
was October 20, 1998. The jury instruction under
appeal was not filed until November 18, 1999.
Therefore, by submitting the jury instruction to the
court after the deadline, Schwartz waived any challenge
to the trial judge's refusal to give the instruction.
Furthermore, we fail to see how the instruction would
have benefitted Schwartz, since under the
circumstances of this case, breaking the law by crossing
the double yellow line mitigates against Benzow's
negligence in that if he did so, it would only have
helped him to avoid the bikers.
*2 Schwartz's objection to the inconsistent jury verdict,
as well as her request for the jury instruction were not
timely, and therefore, Schwartz waived these issues.
Also, if the admission of the hearsay testimony at trial
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

was error, the error was harmless. Accordingly, we
affirm.

BILLINGS and QRME. JJ., concur.
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